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The Frankfurt School and the Authoritarian Personality: Balance Sheet of an Insight 





Frankfurt School Critical Theory is perhaps the most significant theory of society to have developed directly from a research 
programme focused on the critique of political authoritarianism, as it manifested during the interwar decades of the twentieth 
century. The Frankfurt School’s analysis of the persistent roots—and therefore the perennial nature—of what it describes as 
the ‘authoritarian personality,’ remains influential in the analysis of authoritarian populism in the contemporary world, as 
evidenced by several recent studies. Yet the tendency in these studies is to reference the final formulation of the category, as 
expressed in Theodor Adorno and cothinkers’ The Authoritarian Personality (1950), as if this were a theoretical readymade 
that can be unproblematically inserted into a measured assessment of the threat to democracy posed by current authoritarian 
trends. It is high time that the theoretical commitments and political stakes in the category of the authoritarian personality are 
re-evaluated, in light of the evolution of the Frankfurt School. In this paper, I review the classical theories of the authoritarian 
personality, arguing that two quite different versions of the theory—one characterological, the other psychodynamic—can be 
extracted from Frankfurt School research. 
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ARTICLE:  
(6,000 words) 
Research into the nature and spread of fascism in the period from the 1930s to the 1950s led the foremost 
members of the Frankfurt School to formulate theories of the authoritarian personality and fascist propaganda that have 
become standard references. Although the leading members of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, were not able at the time to work out a robust formulation of their theory, the authoritarian personality is 
nonetheless an important discovery in political psychology. Today it has become a crucial point of departure in discussions 
of the resurgence of authoritarian populism and the rise of the neo-fascist right (or “Alt-Right”). Yet the concept of the 
authoritarian personality, particularly as elaborated in the signature work on the topic, Adorno and cothinkers’ Studies in 
Prejudice, Volume 1: The Authoritarian Personality (1950), needs further examination. The articulation of the theory in 
the 1950s was strongly connected with a sweeping denunciation of modern society, as an “administered world” with 
totalitarian potentials. To this end, work on the authoritarian personality was inflected by Adorno and Horkheimer in the 
direction of a “philosophical anthropology of bourgeois Man,” whose intention was to demonstrate that modern individuals 
are latent authoritarians. The notion that the majority of modern individuals have personality structures that involve 
“repressed” forms of the “sado-masochistic character,” typical of fascism, may have resonated with some of the bleak theses 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947). But it is unlikely that most contemporary researchers into the resurgence of 
authoritarian populism are prepared to uncritically accept such theoretical commitments today.  
I contend that in the long march from Studies in the Family and Authority (1936) to The Authoritarian Personality 
(1950), Frankfurt School researchers tended to lose contact with the original research question of the 1920s. That 
problematic was not exclusively focused on the authoritarian personalities who populated the ranks of the fascist cadre 
organisations, but was also directed to the urgent question of the prospects for success of fascist propaganda. Initial findings 
from the empirical studies done under the auspices of the Institute for Social Research indicated, not a vast reservoir of 
pliant drones whose latent programming led them to patiently await an activation statement from the fascist master, but 
significant ambivalence towards authoritarian attitudes. In the work of Erich Fromm in particular, the aim of the social 
psychology that the Institute developed was to grasp character structure as a socially-conditioned repertoire of coping 
mechanisms that might, under crisis conditions, be overwhelmed. The category of “regression,” rather than “repression,” 
was invoked to explain how individuals, in the presence of such trigger conditions, might become susceptible to the infantile 
and irrational aspects of fascist propaganda. Accordingly, I intend to contrast the late-stage articulation of the theory of the 
authoritarian personality with the original research question, and to compare the final philosophical anthropology with the 
original psycho-dynamic theoretical framework. I conclude that the category of the authoritarian personality makes a 
valuable contribution to understanding the resurgence of political extremism today. But I argue that this is only when it is 
interpreted through a psychodynamic, rather than a philosophical-anthropological, framework. 
 
THE CLASSICAL FORMULATION  
The (henceforth “classical”) Frankfurt School theories of the nature of fascist politics, the authoritarian personality 
and the way that fascist propaganda works are most influentially articulated in Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1947) and surrounding works, especially Adorno’s sections of Studies in Prejudice I: The Authoritarian 
Personality (1950). The four volumes of Studies in Prejudice were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee’s 
Department of Scientific Research and led by a team of Berkeley-based researchers, including Theodor Adorno, Else 
Frenkel-Brunswick, Nevitt Sanford and Daniel Levinson. On the basis of survey responses from 2,099 respondents, the 
team conducted interviews with several hundred individuals who scored highly on measures of prejudice and/or 
authoritarianism, with the aim of determining whether a correlation existed between proto-fascist attitudes and social 
prejudices, especially anti-Semitism. The study reported that it had discovered a distinct personality type—the authoritarian 
personality—whose illiberal social attitudes were linked to hostility towards designated out-groups, including Jews, and 
which posed a concerning threat to democracy. Although the authoritarian personality represented a minority of the 
population (less than 25%), Adorno’s sections of the report warned darkly that “personality patterns that have been 
dismissed as ‘pathological’ because they were not in keeping with the most common manifest trends … in society, have, on 
closer investigation, turned out to be but exaggerations of what was almost universal below the surface” (Adorno et al., 
2019: 7). Prospects for neo-fascism in America under McCarthyite anti-Communism were, in other words, disturbingly 
good, and the sponsors were right to worry that American democracy was not immune to anti-Semitic populism.  
Adorno’s formulations have become a standard reference in discussions of the resurgence of authoritarian populism 
today, with Peter Gordon discussing the theory in his section of Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory 
(2018) and Robyn Marasco editing a special edition of SAQ on the authoritarian personality (117(4), 2018). The core 
characteristics of the authoritarian personality that are typically singled out today are reasonably well-known: authoritarian 
submission (i.e., unquestioning obedience), authoritarian aggression (i.e., hostility to dissent and deviance) and rigid 
conventionalism (i.e., moral conformity to conventional values) (Altemeyer, 1996: 6-7). As a matter of fact, however, the 
(celebrated or infamous) “F-scale,” used to measure authoritarian tendencies, had nine items, including “anti-introception,” 
or lack of cathexis (i.e., emotional coldness, lack of imagination and strict discipline); identification with power; and, 
superstition and stereotyping (Adorno et al., 2019: 228). Additionally, high scorers on the F-scale regarded the world as a 
chaotic and dangerous place, had a destructive attitude to humanity and were inclined to believe that sexual depravity was 
rampant in society (Adorno et al., 2019: 228). In Adorno’s subsequent reflections on the project, he suggests that the items 
on were based on the “Elements of Anti-Semitism” chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno, 2016). The “Elements 
of Anti-Semitism” chapter was itself derived from the concept of the sado-masochistic character (explained in detail in a 
moment), the personality structure attributed to fascist attitudes (Müller-Doohm, 2009: 296). It is therefore not entirely 
surprising that the study detected a strong correlation between high scores on the F-scale and ethnic prejudices, especially 
anti-Semitism, and that Adorno would interpret this as evidence for a specific developmental trajectory.  
Methodological circularity is not the only problem with the study. Adorno also routinely reduced the core 
authoritarian attitudes to three central characteristics—“rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy” (Adorno et al., 2019: 
751)—but these are manifestly different to those highlighted by contemporary researchers. The underlying reason for this 
emerges in the surrounding penumbra of works produced alongside Dialectic of Enlightenment, during, or in the aftermath 
of, the Second World War, such as Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1949), Adorno’s Minima Moralia (1951) and 
Adorno’s Philosophy of Modern Music (1949). As is well known, the core thesis of Dialectic of Enlightenment concerns 
the dialectical subversion of humanity by its own ego-centred, instinctually-self-preservative, instrumental rationality, which 
results in (contra Marx) historical scission between the tendential increase in the productive forces and radically decreasing 
potentials for human liberation. Central to the notion that the “Enlightenment is totalitarian” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
2002: 4), which emerges from this position, is the idea that instrumental rationality demands, alongside social domination 
and the reduction of the natural environment to raw materials, the fierce repression of inner nature. “Humanity had to 
inflict terrible injuries on itself,” Adorno and Horkheimer write, “before the self, the identical, purpose-directed, masculine 
character of human beings was created, and something of this process is repeated in every childhood” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2002: 26). The name for these terrible injuries, it turns out, is the sado-masochistic character, described by—
yes, you guessed it—rigid (or identity) thinking (dealt with in Eclipse), emotional coldness (the subject of Minima Moralia) 
and primitive defense mechanisms (exhibited in the “Stravinsky” chapter of Modern Music).  
The underlying logic of this construction of the authoritarian personality is clearly exhibited in Horkheimer’s major 
statement on Critical Theory and anti-Semitism, “The Jews and Europe” (1939), which articulates the background to the 
anti-Semitism chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer opens the essay by declaring that “whoever wants to 
explain anti-Semitism must speak of National Socialism,” before shifting to the main focus, which is that “whoever is not 
willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism” (Horkheimer, 1989: 77, 78). The central thesis, then, 
is that “the totalitarian order differs from its bourgeois predecessor only in that it has lost its inhibitions,” or, in other 
words, “fascism is the truth of modern society” (Horkheimer, 1989: 78). Correlatively, the authoritarian personality is the 
characteristic subjectivity of the bourgeois epoch, as Horkheimer implies in “Egoism and the Freedom Movements: On the 
Anthropology of the Bourgeois Era” (1936). Discussing Freud, Horkheimer maintains that psychoanalysis shows that 
bourgeois society provides “social prohibitions that, under the given familial and social conditions, are suitable for arresting 
people’s instinctual development at a sadistic level or reverting them back to this level” (Horkheimer, 1993: 104). These 
social conditions are so highly general that they characterise the epoch as a whole: the “sado-masochism” of the popular 
masses, evident in fascism and anti-Semitism, is generated by the internalisation, through “introversion” (or identification), 
of social authority, which is hostile to pleasure (Horkheimer, 1993: 103). Just as fascism is the truth of modernity, then, the 
authoritarian personality is the dark secret of the autonomous individual, something that new developments in state 
capitalism and the culture industry have brought to the surface. For Adorno and Horkheimer, and cothinkers such as 
Herbert Marcuse, such proto-fascist personalities represented a new anthropological type, emergent in a postwar social 
context that opposed neo-fascism to communism. This global confrontation had the implication that America might soon 




DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 
The hidden key to Adorno’s contributions to The Authoritarian Personality, then, is the social theory whose 
definitive articulation is provided by Dialectic of Enlightenment, with its paradoxical thesis that fascism is the “rebellion of 
nature” against repression (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 152; Horkheimer, 1974: 123). The guiding systematic thesis of 
Dialectic is that economics, politics, culture and psychology form a seamless functional totality that has, in important 
respects, broken free from classical dynamics involving capitalist contradictions. Under the dominance of “instrumental 
reason,” a sort of technocratic collectivism has emerged to become a new social formation that they describe as a rationally 
planned “administered world,” with democratic, fascist and socialist variants (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: xi-xii, 235). 
Although Adorno and Horkheimer stop short of announcing that the administered society is post-capitalist, they do regard 
its suppression of class struggle and crisis tendencies as effectively permanent (Abromeit, 2011: 394-424). The main 
development facilitating authoritarian social formations is the transformation of reason into a faculty for formal calculations 
that can—as they argue in the chapter on morality—be applied to irrational and immoral ends. In the dialectic of 
enlightenment, the domination of nature dialectically turns against the wielders of instrumental reason, returning as social 
domination, so that modern society is rationally planned but globally irrational. The role of the culture industry is to 
provide substitute satisfactions capable of offsetting the instinctual repression (the postponement of pleasure, and, indeed, 
the infliction of suffering) involved in economics and politics. The culture industry’s manipulation adapts the individual to 
a formally-rational, technocratic civilization, one whose ends involve the subjection of the individual to society as a reified 
totality which appears as a terrifying “second nature”.  
Meanwhile, fascism acts as a release valve when the renunciation of instinctual satisfactions becomes intolerable, 
involving the projection onto designated out-groups of “socially tabooed impulses” that are repressed in the individual. 
“Under the pressure of the superego,” they write, “the ego projects aggressive urges emanating from the id which, through 
their strength, are a danger to itself, as malign intentions onto the outside world, and succeeds in ridding itself of them as 
reactions to that outside world, either in fantasy, by identification with the alleged malefactor, or in reality, by ostensible 
self-defense” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 158). Fascism, Adorno and Horkheimer remind the reader repeatedly, is not 
simply the return of repressed nature, but the return of repressed nature, that is, libido twisted by aggression and split off 
from the ego, and projected onto the other. Accordingly, fascism awakens an impulse to violent sensuality and sensualised 
violence, “neither unsublimated nor regressive libido, but intellectual pleasure in regression, amor intellectualis diaboli, the 
joy of destroying civilization with its own weapons” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 74).  
On this interpretation, the chapter on “Juliette, or, Enlightenment and Morality,” which reads Kant with Sade, is the 
centrepiece of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The argument is that formal morality is consistent with substantive immorality, 
because it involves the imposition of logical consistency on arbitrary contents. The choice of Sade to demonstrate this thesis 
is motivated by the idea that the Enlightenment superego is sadistic in its excessive enforcement of the rules, while the 
modern ego is masochistic in its submission to the superegoic repression of nature. Accordingly, the Enlightenment is not 
only “totalitarian,” but also “perverse,” because the repression of nature twists sexuality into guilt and shame, with the 
paradoxical result that domination and submission become sexualised (because “dirty”) (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 
79, 85, 89). As John Abromeit notes, in his study of Horkheimer, “Erich Fromm’s analysis of the sadomasochistic character 
begins with a discussion of the same mechanism that Horkheimer placed in the centre of his analysis of the bourgeois 
character, namely … the psychoanalytic concept of the superego”. Abromeit adds that “Fromm’s analysis of the 
sadomasochistic character structure … was an important theoretical source for Horkheimer’s concept of bourgeois 
anthropology” (Abromeit, 2011: 282-283). Consequently, just as the administered society is latently totalitarian in 
democratic, fascist and communist variants, so too, the modern individual is latently both authoritarian and submissive to 
authority, and always potentially prejudiced.  
The logic at work in Dialectic of Enlightenment involves the inflation of a category from social psychology—the 
sadomasochistic character—whose intended scope extends to about 10% of the population, to the underlying structure of 
the bourgeois individual as such. Adorno’s contribution to The Authoritarian Personality is a prolongation of this tendency, 
which involves a philosophical anthropology that aims to correlate capitalist society with psychic structuration, through a 
global description of bourgeois subjectivity. Indeed, Adorno’s introduction to The Authoritarian Personality was drafted 
while he and Horkheimer were writing-up the final version of Dialectic of Enlightenment, and his remarks are entirely 
consistent with the finished version of the chapters on morality and anti-Semitism. Adorno’s central claim is that although 
the authoritarians identified by the F-scale in the study constituted a tiny minority of the survey population, they 
nonetheless represent the typical character structure of the bourgeois epoch. Adorno thinks that the socially normative 
resolution of the Oedipus Complex involves a family environment of emotional coldness, a disciplinarian father and distant 
mother, and an atmosphere of obedience to arbitrary rules (Adorno et al., 2019: 751).  
“The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. … 
The pattern … is … a specific resolution of the Oedipus Complex … Love for the mother comes under a 
severe taboo. The resulting hatred against the father is transformed by reaction-formation into love. This 
transformation leads to a particular kind of superego. … In the psychodynamics of the ‘authoritarian 
character,’ part of the preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while another part is 
left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with whom the subject does not identify: ultimately, the 
outgroup” (Adorno et al., 2019: 759).  
The result is a sadomasochistic personality structure that Adorno locates most directly in the middle strata 
(especially the traditional petit-bourgeoisie), but argues has “a real mass base” well beyond the intermediate layers (Adorno 
et al., 2019: 759). Characteristics of the F-Scale involving rigid conventionalism, submission to authority and hostility to 
out-groups (“rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy” (Adorno et al., 2019: 751)) can be linked, via the idea of a sado-
masochistic personality structure, to regressive ideation (magical thinking, mythical beliefs) and to paranoid projections 
(involving projected hostility and phantasmatic persecution). The character syndrome of the authoritarian personality 
involves ego weakness and the introjection of—rather than identification with—the paternal imago, as the basis for a harsh 
superego, something which lends moral conscience and social ideals an external, punitive quality (Adorno et al., 2019: 754-
762). Furthermore, there is a tendency to transfer of idealisation and affection onto social leaders, who are expected to 
protect the helpless ego from competitive pressures and social crisis. Finally, the weakened ego of the authoritarian 
personality is corroded by the increasingly direct socialisation of the individual into conformist subjectivity by cultural 
industries and bureaucratic apparatuses, which “stamp variegated social processes” onto individual persons, recruiting them 
to “psychological classes” (Adorno et al., 2019: 757). To bring the empirical findings of the study into line with this 
philosophical anthropology, Adorno and cothinkers generate the category of the “pseudo-conservative,” a figure who, 
although not a manifest authoritarian, is described as having superficial non-authoritarian attitudes, combined with the same 
sado-masochistic resolution of the Oedipus Complex as the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 2019: 676). In short, 
not only does fascism represent the scarcely concealed totalitarian potentials of state capitalism, under conditions of the 
decline of liberalism, but also, the authoritarian personality represents a pathological character structure just hidden beneath 
the surface of the modern individual.  
 
 
PSYCHODYNAMIC ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s philosophical anthropology, although it is framed in Freudian terms, actually trails 
psychodynamic resonances without meaningful theoretical correspondence to the psychoanalytic concepts that describe 
disturbances of equilibrium. It is a disease-like latency/activation model that is perhaps best grasped, not as a fully-
formulated social theory of the emergence of authoritarian politics within modern societies, but in terms of its polemical 
intentions. Rhetorically speaking, Adorno’s articulation of the authoritarian personality is satiric—“personality patterns that 
have been dismissed as ‘pathological’ … have … turned out to be but exaggerations of what was almost universal”—where 
satire is understood as the exhibition of a ridiculous exaggeration as a means of bringing to light hitherto unseen problems 
with the norm. What is ridiculous about the exaggeration is not the authoritarian personality, but the desperate theoretical 
contortions required to assimilate the “pseudo-conservative” majority to the pathological group. This might well have the 
salutary satirical effect of alerting the reader to the prevalence of uncritical attitudes towards social authorities. But its 
unfortunate theoretical effect is that it substitutes an unsubstantiated answer—“they are latent authoritarians”—for a real 
research question—“how do fascist demagogues recruit popular masses to authoritarian ideologies?” 
In this context, it is important to notice that the main finding of the survey of working-class and middle-class social 
attitudes in Germany in the early 1930s, conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Social Research, was emphatically 
not that the majority of the population was latently authoritarian. Instead, what the (belated) analysis of the empirical 
research indicated was that significant ambivalence towards authoritarian values existed amongst blue-collar workers and 
white-collar employees (Fromm, 1984: 228). According to Fromm, the “most important result” of the inquiry was that 
only about 15% of the leftwing workers held radical attitudes consistent with their political affiliations—the rest seemed to 
have adapted themselves to capitalism, holding leftwing views as consolatory resentments or as passive expectations (Fromm, 
1984: 229-230). Additionally, some 19% of leftwing respondents and 15% of centrist respondents showed an “unreliable” 
combination of authoritarianism with rebelliousness, consistent with their eventual embrace of the contradictory doctrine of 
“national socialism” (Fromm, 1984: 43). We might say now that under conditions where fascism did not need to win a 
genuine majority, this suggests a sufficiently large, ready constituency of authoritarian followers, to supplement the 
authoritarian personalities of the fascist cadres. The problem at the time was that the categories of the initial study were 
derived from political allegiances, not from social characterology, so that no meaningful conclusions could be drawn about 
the psychological mechanisms governing the swing from social democracy to national socialism (Wiggershaus, 1994: 172).  
To respond to this question, between 1929 and 1938, Erich Fromm developed a social psychology centred on the 
notion of social character, grasped as a libidinal structure socialised into the personality, consisting of social-strata-specific 
forms of ego maturity, defense mechanisms, capacities for sublimation and orientations to authority. In the informal 
division of labour within the early Frankfurt School, Fromm (supplemented by leftwing analysts such as Otto Fenichel) was 
mainly responsible for the critical integration of Freudian psychoanalysis with historical materialism (Jacoby, 1986: 108-
109; Dahmer, 1982: 216-262). In two extended articles for the journal of the Institute for Social Research, Fromm detailed 
an approach that was to have a significant influence within the Frankfurt School’s adoption of Freudo-Marxism (Fromm, 
1991b; Fromm, 1991c). Fromm’s historicisation of psychoanalytic categories involved a critique of Freud’s naturalisation of 
the specifically bourgeois form of the family institution (together with considerable sympathy for feminist perspectives) 
(Fromm, 1991d). Rejecting the late development of an opposition between erotic instincts and the death drive, Fromm 
argued for retaining the opposition between the relative fixity of the survival instincts and the relative plasticity of the 
libidinal drives. This opposition potentially explained how the repression of sexuality could provide the surplus energy 
necessary for civilizational advances, at the cost of an aggravation and localisation of the Oedipus Complex. However, 
Fromm argued, the “renunciation of instinctual satisfactions” demanded for the production of an increasing social surplus 
product was not evenly distributed within the division of labour. Instead, in line with Freud’s discussion of the “discontent 
with civilization,” material inequalities, springing from property structures, determined that the labouring classes had fierce 
demands imposed on them, which often led to resentment of authority (Fromm, 1991b).  
Fromm’s studies of Christianity had already indicated that the political defeat of the demand for a relaxation of 
excessive repression had led to the intensified idealisation of authority, that is, to an identification with divine authority 
against terrestrial authority, supported by the fantasy of redemption (Fromm, 1955: 46-47). In the modern context, 
amongst the German popular classes, the psyche as a whole had become increasingly reliant on the superego for equilibrium, 
with the result that the weakened, or immature, ego, could not control instinctual impulses successfully without resorting to 
repression, supported by strong feelings of guilt (Fromm, 1991c: 164). In Fromm’s terminology, the ego structure of the 
dominated classes displayed a distinctly submissive relation to authority figures, based on its masochistic relation to a 
punitive, and morally primitive, because highly conventional, superego (Fromm, 1991c: 169). Nonetheless, Fromm insisted 
that this basic situation was susceptible to considerable individual variation (based on individual instinctual endowment and 
the particularities of the parental figures) and was highly differentiated across distinct social strata, because of the varying 
demands placed on socio-economic groups (Fromm, 1991c: 174). Accordingly, the notion of social character, presented in 
the 1932 articles, is to be completed by the historical analysis of the evolution of family structures in the division of labour, 
as well as of the differentiation of social strata within different modes of production.  
 
 
FASCISM AND ANXIETY: THE REGRESSION HYPOTHESIS 
Fromm’s theoretical section of Studies on Authority and the Family (1936) presents his discovery of the 
“authoritarian masochistic character” (Fromm, 1963: 110-137), from the empirical research reported in The Working 
Class in Weimar Germany [Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reichs] (Fromm, 1984), and the theoretical 
considerations of the 1932 papers. It is crucial to realize that although the referent of the title Working Class is actually 
“workers and employees,” invoking a distinction between the salaried white-collar employees and the waged, blue-collar 
workers, the object of Studies in Authority and the Family was “the bourgeois family” (Horkheimer, 1963b: ix). Indeed, 
Studies actually included surveys of small business people and independent tradespersons, particularly in its second part 
(post-1933), assembled from results from other countries in Western Europe (Horkheimer, 1963a: 229-469). Nonetheless, 
Fromm’s focus is not particularly on the development of a stratification map of the social psychology of the labouring 
classes, but rather, on the thesis that a historically particular form of the family inculcates a specific vulnerability to 
authoritarianism into the popular masses.  
Although directly after this study, Fromm reconsidered elements of his Freudianism, in Studies, the regression 
hypothesis of a specific immaturity in the relation to authority is presented in terms of libido theory and the normative 
model of the Oedipus Complex. Fromm maintains that “a particular situation of authority exists in the father-son 
relationship in the typical petty-bourgeois family structure: the father is feared, and he is obeyed without contradiction or 
hesitation—this generates an ambivalent mixture of awe and hate towards the father” (Fromm, 1963: 77). Regarding the 
superego as an agency that represents social coercion and cultural prohibition in the psyche, Fromm proposes that “through 
identification with this kind of father, the superego becomes [a representative of external coercion] that is draped with the 
command attributes of morality and potency” (Fromm, 1963: 85). Fromm’s depth-psychological explanation of the 
implications of this process of formation of the superego invokes the three stages of the Oedipus Complex (Fromm, 1963: 
93-109). Direct introjection of paternal command, combined with ambivalence towards the father (stage I), is succeeded by 
identification with the father’s potency and morality [Moralität und Macht] (stage II). This installs the superego within the 
psyche as a representation of (socially-conformist) conscience, at the cost of repression of the ambivalence towards the 
father. Finally, the traversal of the Oedipus Complex happens (or not!) through the ego gaining rational control over 
impulses, which results in the dissolution of both the superego and ambivalence (stage III). Fromm associates this with both 
reflexive morality and revolutionary politics (Fromm, 1963: 119 fn111). According to Fromm, in the authoritarian context 
of middle-class socialisation, the typical result is a social character that is arrested at stage II of the oedipal crisis and that 
can easily regress to the infantile stage I of the oedipal drama, something whose implications are clearly exhibited in the 
“sado-masochistic character” of the authoritarian personality (Fromm, 1963: 110-137). 
Following Freud’s essay on “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” Fromm argues that the process of the 
formation of the superego can flow backwards, especially when the traversal of the Oedipus Complex is incomplete, as is the 
case, Fromm thinks, in the socially-normative family type. The father-like leader figure, potent bearer of the ideal, usurps 
the role of the individual’s superego, converting the individual into a “soldier” before this “officer”—provided that 
“external force dictates the docility of the crowd/masses” (Fromm, 1963: 86). This is by no means a fixed and final result: 
“the preservation of the superego depends on the reinforcement, again and again, of the internalisation of external coercion,” 
because “the dynamically decisive element in the formation of the superego is the maintenance of the ego’s fear of social 
sanctions” (Fromm, 1963: 88). Accordingly, a climate of anxiety is a necessary condition for the regression of the individual 
from a superego-formative identification with potent and idealised authority, to the infantile situation of a direct 
introjection of tyrannical external authority, through the internalisation of the commands of the (hated and loved) leader 
(Fromm, 1963: 88).  
The problem with this position emerges after Fromm’s subsequent break with orthodox Freudianism and its 
exclusive reliance on an instinctual model to explain social psychology (Fromm, 1991a). Fromm’s explanation of the drift 
into authoritarianism depends on forms of realistic fear that have nothing to do with libidinally-generated anxiety; yet, 
according to the model, authoritarianism is the result of a resurgence of the oedipal crisis that pivots on libidinal repression. 
In Escape from Freedom (1941), Fromm effectively proposes a division of labour between socially-conditioned survival 
instincts and socially-oriented libidinal dynamics, in which “ontological insecurity” overwhelms learnt responses to coping 
with reality, but the individual responds to “social helplessness” by turning to beloved (and resented) authority figures.  
“[T]he essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group has developed as the result of the 
basic life experiences and mode of life common to that group” (Fromm, 1994: 276), Fromm proposes. The failure of social 
structures to provide support for different stages of learning and development results in stagnation at a given level of 
achievement. In particular, the transition from familial security to social uncertainty is fraught with danger because of the 
lack of support structures, which entails a thesis on the developmental experience and coping mechanisms of different social 
strata. When these mechanisms of coping with reality are exhausted by circumstances, when “the economic social and 
political conditions … do not offer a basis for the realization of individuality … while at the same time, people have lost 
those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden”. A situation arises in which “powerful 
tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission, or some kind of relationship of man to the world 
which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom” (Fromm, 1994: 36-37).  
Fromm then discusses four main “mechanisms of escape,” intended to connect the character-dynamic theory with 
personality-type research undertaken in the 1930s. In general, the result is “automaton conformity,” the relinquishment of 
individuality through compulsive actions that control panic at the expense of resigning from the effort to rationally control 
impulses and the environment (Fromm, 1994: 158-177). But more sinister mechanisms of escape exist, such as the sado-
masochistic dynamics of the authoritarian personality (Fromm, 1994: 122-152), or the proto-psychotic destructive rage 
that happens when the thwarting of the whole of a life is projected outwards as the will-to-destruction (Fromm, 1994: 153-
157).   
  
 
SADO-MASOCHISTIC CHARACTERS: THE REPRESSION HYPOTHESIS 
Horkheimer’s “Authority and the Family,” the theoretical introduction to Studies on Authority and the Family, 
develops a set of anthropological generalities regarding the essentially authoritarian social function of the bourgeois family 
(Horkheimer, 2002). Its main theoretical sources are Marx’s “1859 Preface” and some sections of Engels’ The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State—Horkheimer restates the productive force determinism of these two texts in 
terms of “cultural lag,” but delicately avoids naming either thinker (Horkheimer, 2002: 65)—together with seven volumes 
of Nietzsche’s Collected Works. Perhaps surprisingly, given Fromm’s psychoanalytically-inflected contribution to Studies, 
Nietzsche in fact dwarfs all other references, even Hegel, with Freud relegated to the dustbin of idealism in his first, last, 
and only citation (Horkheimer, 2002: 56). In light of this, the thesis on the latently sado-masochistic personality structure 
characteristic of the bourgeois epoch is probably better described as a “suppression” hypothesis, rather than repression in 
the Freudian sense. But I have kept the psychoanalytic terminology because in subsequent work, Horkheimer adopts this 
terminology, albeit without substantive alteration of the Nietzschean concept.   
The first part of Horkheimer’s essay develops the argument that bourgeois liberty centres on the contradictions of 
economic freedom under conditions of private property and the wage system, so that the rationalistic anti-authoritarianism 
of the Enlightenment quickly finds its limits in the reified authority of the “second nature” of economic facts, themselves 
based on domination. “Nietzsche more than anyone else saw what underlies social relationships,” Horkheimer maintains: 
“The psychic apparatus of members of a class society in so far as they do not belong to the nucleus of privileged people, 
serves in large measure only to interiorize or at least to rationalize and supplement physical coercion” (Horkheimer, 2002: 
56). The only impact of the Enlightenment on domination was the camouflaging of authoritarianism: “the compulsion 
upon the masses to submit to killing labour was rationalized into a moral imperative” (Horkheimer, 2002: 83), while 
“submission to the categorical imperative of [social] duty has been from the beginning a conscious goal of the bourgeois 
family” (Horkheimer, 2002: 99).  
Accordingly, the second part of the essay proposes that the authority of economics and labour discipline, especially 
submission to management, is inculcated especially through familial socialisation: an education in obedience is the residual 
social function of an otherwise vanishing household unit (Horkheimer, 2002: 101, 102). The agent of this blind 
submission to external authority, ratified in law, is the father, whose position unites the idea that “might makes right” with 
his privileged status as the familial breadwinner (Horkheimer, 2002: 100, 105). Adaptation to this situation is a “first rate 
schooling in the authority behaviour specific to this form of society” (Horkheimer, 2002: 107), perhaps rationalised by the 
conscious calculation that “father has all the money,” and reinforced by parental discipline and female subordination 
(Horkheimer, 2002: 114).  
Horkheimer does passingly entertain the possibility that paternal authoritarianism might be undermined by (if not 
by rational socialisation and schooling), proletarianisation and unemployment, women’s entry into work, or filial rebellion 
(Horkheimer, 2002: 123-124). But his inclination is to save the hypothesis by counter-assertion: “Among the lower classes 
… where pressure on the father is transmuted into pressure on his children, the result has been directly to increase, along 
with cruelty, the masochistic inclination to surrender one’s will to any leader whatsoever” (Horkheimer, 2002: 110). 
Presumably, this casts Fromm’s contribution in the role of providing evidence for this claim.  
Meanwhile, Horkheimer reaches a strikingly global conclusion: “As long as there is no decisive change in the basic 
structure of social life and in the modern culture which rests on that structure, the family will continue to exercise its 
indispensable function of producing specific, authority-oriented types of character” (Horkheimer, 2002: 112). That 
conclusion is supported alongside “Authority and the Family,” in Horkheimer’s extended sketch for an anthropology of the 
sadomasochistic character of the bourgeois individual, “Egoism and Freedom Movements: On the Anthropology of the 
Bourgeois Era” (1936) (Horkheimer, 1993). Here, in work prepared at the same time as the introduction to Studies but 
published in the Institute’s journal, the surprised reader discovers that Freud, after all, provides “significant insight” into the 
problem of authoritarianism. “The transformation of psychic energies that takes place in the process of internalization,” 
Horkheimer states, “cannot be understood today without the psychoanalytical perspective” (Horkheimer, 1993: 105). 
However, aside from the description of the masses as “sadomasochistic,” the contribution of psychoanalysis is restricted to 
the claim that “social prohibitions, under the given familiar and general social conditions, are suited for arresting people’s 
instinctual development at a sadistic level, or reverting them back to this level” (Horkheimer, 1993: 105).  
In general, the line of the essay is the same as that in Studies: Horkheimer proposes to derive the psychodynamics of 
bourgeois subjectivity from the contradictions of capitalism (between formal freedom and substantive exploitation), the 
class struggles of the bourgeoisie (against both aristocracy and the proletariat), and the rhetoric of bourgeois revolutionaries. 
The social structure of capitalist society, combined with its history of revolutionary movements that are transformed into 
conduits of popular submission, imposes a masochistic version of bourgeois subjectivity on the labouring classes. 
In Horkheimer’s contributions, then, there is a distinct tendency towards the reification of the psychodynamic 
underpinnings of the Frankfurt School position into a fixed relation between the “bourgeois character,” capitalist society 
and authoritarian potentials. Furthermore, Horkheimer’s underlying project of a “philosophical anthropology of the 
bourgeois era,” was intended to demonstrate that liberal capitalism’s contradiction between formal freedom and substantive 
unfreedom was psychologically supported by strong repression. That is characterised by a strong renunciation of instinctual 
satisfactions, supported by superego formations that foster guilt and asceticism, together with repressed needs whose release 
is gained, not by rebellion, but by symptomatic hostility towards designated out-groups. In short, in Horkheimer’s 
philosophical anthropology, Fromm’s “sadomasochistic character,” a personality which is subservient to authority but 
sadistic in the enforcement of social norms, becomes increasingly generalised. The chapters on anti-Semitism and morality 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment present the final state of this theory, while Adorno goes on to seek corroboration of the thesis 
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